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Celo
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Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
Badges
About
Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
2025 Mar 26 — Dec 10
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Mar 26 — Dec 10
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum
EigenDA.
2025 Mar 12 — Dec 10
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Jello hardfork activates OP Succinct Lite
2025 Dec 10th
Celo implements OP Succinct Lite, introducing ZK proofs for dispute resolution and DA verification.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.
There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Data is posted to EigenDA
Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
- EigenDA Docs - Overview
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EigenDAState roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond. Once created, the game enters a challenge period during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by also posting a bond. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1.
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Roles:
Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).
- OpFoundationUpgradeSafe has the role if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- Optimism EOA 1 has the role though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.
Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- Celo native asset Token ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfigLocal ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Can interact with DelayedWETH
- can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- A Guardian LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfigLocal
- act as an override that pauses the SuperchainConfigLocal
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- A Guardian Optimism Guardian Multisig
Participants (13):
0x07dC…d0730x652B…cB5f0x1822…925e0x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390x0aA3…75D70x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90x9282…cACbA Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin
Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.
- Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security CouncilA Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of CeloProxyAdminOwner.
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of CeloProxyAdminOwner.
- A Sequencer - acting directly
- A Guardian DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function → Optimism Guardian Multisig
- A Guardian - acting directly
- A Proposer - acting directly
- A Challenger - acting directly
- Can interact with DelayedWETH
- can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency
Ethereum
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
- This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
A local contract acting as source of truth for the paused status and the guardian role for the local chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: EOA 2
- superchainConfig: SuperchainConfig if the (global) SuperchainConfig is paused
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
- This contract can store any token.
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
- Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
- Roles:
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
- Roles:
- owner: CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
- owner: EOA 11
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
- owner: CeloProxyAdminOwner
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.
- Roles:
- challengers: EOA 12, EOA 13, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 8, EOA 9
- proposers: EOA 10, EOA 3
Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).